BOLLOCKS!! Designing pervasive games that play with the social rules of built environments

We propose that pervasive games designed with mechanics that are specifically in opposition with, or disruptive of, social rules of the environment in which they are played, have unique potential to provide interesting, provocative experiences for players. We explore this concept through the design and evaluation of an experimental game prototype, Shhh!, inspired by the juvenile game Bollocks, and implemented on Android mobile devices, which challenges players to make loud noises in libraries. Six participants played the game before engaging in semi-structured interviews, explored through inductive thematic analysis. Results suggest that the game provoked in players a heightened awareness of social rules, as well as a complex social dilemma of whether or not to act. We conclude by presenting a model for designing games that play with the social, as well as physical, rules of the environments in which they are set

The Strategic Exploitation of Limited Information and Opportunity in Networked Markets

This paper studies the effect of constraining interactions within a market. A model is analysed in which boundedly rational agents trade with and gather information from their neighbours within a trade network. It is demonstrated that a trader’s ability to profit and to identify the equilibrium price is positively correlated with its degree of connectivity within the market. Where traders differ in their number of potential trading partners, well-connected traders are found to benefit from aggressive trading behaviour.Where information propagation is constrained by the topology of the trade network, connectedness affects the nature of the strategies employed

Crises and collective socio-economic phenomena: simple models and challenges

Financial and economic history is strewn with bubbles and crashes, booms and busts, crises and upheavals of all sorts. Understanding the origin of these events is arguably one of the most important problems in economic theory. In this paper, we review recent efforts to include heterogeneities and interactions in models of decision. We argue that the Random Field Ising model (RFIM) indeed provides a unifying framework to account for many collective socio-economic phenomena that lead to sudden ruptures and crises. We discuss different models that can capture potentially destabilising self-referential feedback loops, induced either by herding, i.e. reference to peers, or trending, i.e. reference to the past, and account for some of the phenomenology missing in the standard models. We discuss some empirically testable predictions of these models, for example robust signatures of RFIM-like herding effects, or the logarithmic decay of spatial correlations of voting patterns. One of the most striking result, inspired by statistical physics methods, is that Adam Smith's invisible hand can badly fail at solving simple coordination problems. We also insist on the issue of time-scales, that can be extremely long in some cases, and prevent socially optimal equilibria to be reached. As a theoretical challenge, the study of so-called "detailed-balance" violating decision rules is needed to decide whether conclusions based on current models (that all assume detailed-balance) are indeed robust and generic.Comment: Review paper accepted for a special issue of J Stat Phys; several minor improvements along reviewers' comment

A complex systems approach to constructing better models for managing financial markets and the economy

We outline a vision for an ambitious program to understand the economy and financial markets as a complex evolving system of coupled networks of interacting agents. This is a completely different vision from that currently used in most economic models. This view implies new challenges and opportunities for policy and managing economic crises. The dynamics of such models inherently involve sudden and sometimes dramatic changes of state. Further, the tools and approaches we use emphasize the analysis of crises rather than of calm periods. In this they respond directly to the calls of Governors Bernanke and Trichet for new approaches to macroeconomic modelling.The publication of this work was partially supported by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement No. 284709, a Coordination and Support Action in the Information and Communication Technologies activity area (‘FuturICT’ FET Flagship Pilot Project). Doyne Farmer, Mauro Gallegati and Cars Hommes also acknowledge financial support from the EU-7th framework collaborative project “Complexity Research Initiative for Systemic InstabilitieS (CRISIS)”, grant No. 288501. Cars Hommes acknowledges financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), project “Understanding Financial Instability through Complex Systems”. None of the above are responsible for errors in this paper.Publicad

Variety of Methodological Approach in Economics

It has been argued by some that the distinction between orthodox economics and heterodox economics does not fit the growing variety in economic theory, unified by a common methodological approach. On the other hand, it remains a central characteristic of heterodox economics that it does not share this methodological approach, but rather represents a range of alternative methodological approaches. The paper explores the evidence, and arguments, for variety in economics at different levels, and a range of issues which arise. This requires in turn a discussion of the meaning of variety in economics at the different levels of reality, methodology, method and theory. It is concluded that there is scope for more, rather than less, variety in economic methodologies, as well as within methodologies. Further, if variety is not to take the form of “anything goes”, then critical discussion by economists of different approaches to economics, and of variety itself, is required

Further thoughts on ants and markets

Available from British Library Document Supply Centre- DSC:3597.76(BU-DOE-DP--89/241) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreSIGLEGBUnited Kingdo

Bargaining with posterior opportunities : an evolutionary social simulation

Negotiations have been extensively studied theoretically throughout the years. A well-known bilateral approach is the ultimatum game, where two agents negotiate on how to split a pie or a "dollar": the proposer makes an offer and responder can choose to accept or reject. In this paper a natural extension of the ultimatum game is presented, in which both agents can negotiate with other opponents in case of a disagreement. This way the basics of a competitive market are modeled where for instance a buyer can try several sellers before making a purchase decision. The game is investigated using an evolutionary simulation. The outcomes appear to depend largely on the information available to the agents. We find that if the agents' number of future bargaining opportunities is commonly known, the proposer has the advantage. If this information is held private, however, the responder can obtain a larger share of the pie. For the first case we also provide a game-theoretic analysis and compare the outcome with evolutionary results. Furthermore, the effects of search costs and allowing multiple issues to be negotiated simultaneously are investigated